

CTD6 AMPHIBIOUS FORCES, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
Al6-3/A9-8 TRANSPORT DIVISION SIX
Serial 0122

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

% Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
25 October 1944.

From: Commander Transport Division SIX.
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR,
 (CTU 78.1.3 - Commander PALO Transport Unit).
 (2) Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force,
 (CTG 78.1 - Commander PALO Attack Group).
 (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet,
 (CTF 77 - Commander Central PHILIPPINES Attack
 Force).

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
 20 October 1944.

Reference: (a) Com7thPhib ltr. FE25/Al6-3(3) serial 0212 of
 17 February 1944.

Enclosures: (A) Summary of Cargo Loaded in Division.-p.12
 (B) Summary of Units Embarked in Division.-p.13
 (C) Time of Departure and Landing of Boat Waves.-p.16
 (D) Report of Beach Party Medical Section.-p.17

NARRATIVE

1. Transport Division SIX (temporary) consisting of the following listed vessels: USS FAYETTE (APA43), USS ORMSBY (APA49), USS LEEDSTOWN (APA56), USS TITANIA (AKA13), USS HERCULES (AK41), USS EPPING FOREST (LSD4) and USS CARTER HALL (LSD3) was formed on 26 September 1944 under the command of Captain H.D. BAKER, USN, and designated as Task Unit 78.1.32 to operate as a part of the PALO Transport Unit which was to take part in the assault and occupation of the island of LEYTE. The APA's of this division arrived at HOLLANDIA on 26 September, having just completed taking part in the assault of PELELIU Island, and they were joined on that date by the EPPING FOREST and CARTER HALL. On 1 October, the HERCULES, which had also participated in the attack on PELELIU, and the TITANIA, a vessel which had been operating with the SEVENTH Fleet, joined the division. During the period 1 October to 13 October, the date on which the PALO Attack Force departed for its objective, this unit remained at HUMBOLDT Bay preparing, loading, and training for the coming operation. Needed repairs were accomplished, landing craft were replaced or augmented

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

as required, while the FAYETTE, ORMSBY, and TITANIA exchanged their LCC's for LCM's. All Navy LCM's were replaced by ARMY LCM(6)s belonging to the 532nd Engineer Beach and Shore Regiment; the Navy craft were laid up together under proper supervision to await the return of the division. During this period frequent conferences were held between Commander Transport Division SIX and the Commanding Officer, 34th Infantry Regiment or their representatives concerning details of the loading and the assault landing. Ships loaded cargo during the period 2 October to 8 October, and troops were embarked on 9 October.

2. A rehearsal for this operation took place on 12 October, the day before departure for the objective. Ships of Transport Divisions TWENTY-FOUR and SIX sailed to a point approximately 10 miles east of HUMBOLDT Bay, launched all boats and debarked all assault troops in accordance with CTF 78 Training Order No. 16-44, and Commander Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR speedletter serial 00023 of 10 October. However, no boats were beached, and no cargo was unloaded with the exception of self propelled 75mm howitzers and bull-dozers in the FAYETTE, ORMSBY and LEEDSTOWN. Some delay was encountered in the handling of these vehicles, but with the experience gained in the rehearsal the difficulties were eliminated and these vehicles were unloaded according to schedule on the assault on A-Day.

3. At 1430 13 October this Task Unit got under way with other elements of Task Force 78 and proceeded in accordance with Annex "B" to CTF 78 Operation Plan 101-44, effecting a rendezvous on 15 October with remaining elements of the force who had departed from MANUS. The Task Force proceeded without undue incident and arrived in the transport area off the entrance to the PALO River, LEYTE Island at 0758 20 October 1944, having successfully navigated during the hours of darkness the swept channel through the enemy minefield in SURIGAO Strait. At about 0730 H.M.A.S SHROPSHIRE reported that a mine which had been caught in her paravane gear had broken loose. This mine was sighted directly ahead of Division SIX and the Division was maneuvered to avoid it. A PC was promptly ordered to mark the mine and was circling the mine by the time the FAYETTE passed it. At 0730, 20 October an enemy plane approached the transport disposition but was repelled by anti-aircraft fire from screening vessels. Upon arrival at the transport area at 0758 all boats were lowered and troops embarked in accordance with Commander Task Unit 78.1.3 (Commander Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR) Attack Landing Order No. 18-44. At 0855 the first wave for Red Beach Two left the rendezvous circle off

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

the FAYETTE and started toward the Line of Departure. The FAYETTE despatched the next five waves at 0900, 0903, 0910, 0915, and 0920, while the ORMSBY despatched waves seven through ten at exact five-minute intervals commencing at 0925. The LEEDSTOWN sent in the eleventh wave, also on time, at 0945. The fifteenth wave, consisting of reserve troops from the LEEDSTOWN, was despatched from its rendezvous circle at 1000 and the eight LCM's from the TITANIA which composed the sixteenth and last assault wave left for the Line of Departure at 1017. Confirmation of H-Hour was not received until 0910, so that assault waves had to be despatched from the rendezvous circles prior to the receipt of the confirmation on the assumption that H-Hour would be confirmed. To have waited for the confirmation would have resulted in a failure of the assault waves to arrive at the beach on time.

4. The first eleven waves passed the Line of Departure on time and proceeded with the assault landing. The actual landings of the boats was also almost precisely upon the prearranged schedule, and all aspects of the assault landings were conducted smoothly and reflect great credit upon the planning and the performance of the personnel.

5. By 1050 the FAYETTE beachmaster, who was assigned to Beach Red Fox, and the ORMSBY beachmaster, assigned to Beach Red Easy Two had established their command posts on the beach and were in communication with the Division Beachmaster and Transport Division. At 1230 the Division Beachmaster landed to coordinate the activities between the two beachmasters and the Shore Party Commander for the unloading of cargo for Transport Division SIX.

6. About 1040 boats from the first wave of Transport Division SIX returned and the unloading of vehicles and their attached personnel was immediately commenced. At 1100 the PALO Transport Unit was ordered to move into the unloading area approximately 6000 yards off the beach to facilitate the unloading of cargo and vehicles. Division SIX anchored at about 1200 in its boat lane in a line of bearing perpendicular to the beach. During the whole of A-Day enemy fire on the beach was slight and the boats had no trouble in landing their personnel and cargo. At 1200 the percent of total cargo unloaded was as follows: FAYETTE 23%, ORMSBY 8%, TITANIA 15%, HERCULES 0%, LEEDSTOWN 8%. The unloading of cargo proceeded rapidly as soon as the boats from the assault waves returned to their respective ships. LCM's were used only to unload vehicles which required LCM's, other vehicles being unloaded where possible in LCVP's. No difficulty was experienced by any ship in landing vehicles on the beach

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

and at 1300 the FAYETTE was 42% unloaded, ORMSBY 15%, LEEDSTOWN 15%, TITANIA 25%, HERCULES 0%. Two LSM's were made available to this division and one was assigned to the TITANIA and one to the LEEDSTOWN with instructions to unload vehicles only. The remaining ships of this division unloaded in LCVP's and LCM's. In addition to the LCM's carried by each APA additional LCM's also belonging to the 532nd Engineer Beach and Shore Regiment, were allocated to ships of this division as follows: FAYETTE 3, ORMSBY 2, LEEDSTOWN 3, HERCULES 5. The use of these additional LCM's which had been carried in the EPPING FOREST greatly expedited the unloading of cargo although no bulk cargo was loaded into them until all vehicles were unloaded. Only on the last trip of the LCM's from the ship were they loaded with bulk cargo. As ships completed unloading all available LCM's were assigned to the TITANIA and HERCULES to expedite the unloading of those ships. At 1400 the FAYETTE was 60% unloaded, the ORMSBY 50%, LEEDSTOWN 55%, TITANIA 27%, HERCULES 3% and at 1500 the FAYETTE 90%, ORMSBY 95%, LEEDSTOWN 85%, TITANIA 30%, HERCULES 4%. The ORMSBY completed unloading all cargo at 1517, the FAYETTE at 1525, the LEEDSTOWN at 1620. By 1700 all vehicles from the TITANIA had been unloaded, bulk cargo only remained. An LSM was assigned to the HERCULES as soon as it became available after landing vehicles from the LEEDSTOWN, the operation order required that APA's be unloaded on A-Day, taking precedence over AKA's and AK's. However, all cargo and vehicles required to be landed on A-Day from the TITANIA and HERCULES were landed as prescribed. The EPPING FOREST which carried only LCM's and CARTER HALL which carried barges and pile drivers unloaded these craft promptly after arrival in the transport area and passed from the operational control of Commander Transport Division SIX upon anchoring.

8. The unloaded APA's got under way at 1740 to proceed to the outer transport area where they lay to awaiting the arrival of CTU 78.1.3 (Commander Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR). While lying to in the transport area enemy aircraft were reported approaching and although gunfire was observed to the southward no enemy aircraft were observed and no firing took place from FAYETTE, LEEDSTOWN and ORMSBY. The TITANIA and HERCULES remained in the transport area to complete unloading.

9. Upon the arrival of Commander Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR in DuPAGE at 1942 the APA's of this transport division proceeded in company to join CTG 78.3 at rendezvous latitude 10° 40' North and longitude 125° - 30' East to arrive at 2200. This division joined with CTG 78.3 whose group included Transport Division FOUR, in position 10-31 North, 125-30 East and formed

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A- L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

column astern of Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR at 0130 21 October. Transport Divisions TWENTY and THIRTY-TWO fell in astern of Transport Division SIX for passage through swept channel of SURIGAO Strait. After clearing the mined area, cruising disposition A-1 was formed, line of divisions in order from right to left as follows: Transport Divisions FOUR, TWENTY-FOUR, SIX, TWENTY, THIRTY-TWO with FAYETTE fleet guide and OTC Rear Admiral A.D. STRUBLE (CTG 78.3) in HUGHES. At 07-04 North, 133-00 East Transport Divisions TWENTY and THIRTY-TWO left the formation and the remaining transport divisions proceeded to HOLLANDIA without incident, arriving at 0900, 25 October 1944.

TRAINING

10. The vessels of this unit were well trained, all except the TITANIA having recently completed the assault and occupation of GUAM and PELELIU. The TITANIA had taken part in the assault of GUAM. The rehearsal held at HOLLANDIA was sufficient to coordinate the boat waves and to perfect the timing. Several vessels of this division held individual ships' drills for their boat groups prior to the rehearsal to work out the details of loading and despatching their boats.

LOADING AND LOADING PLANS.

11. The cargo carried in this division was strictly combat loaded and was restricted to that required to support the assault only. The loading plans prepared by the 24th Division of the Army and the 34th Infantry Regiment were thorough and complete and highly satisfactory. No difficulty was experienced in the preparation of the plans and none was experienced at the loading. Vehicles and other cargo were loaded exactly in accordance with the priorities established by the Combat Team Commander. A summary of the cargo loaded on the ships of this division is given in enclosure (A).

12. Troops were embarked at HOLLANDIA on 9 October and the summary of units embarked in vessels of this division is shown in enclosure (B). No difficulty was experienced in the embarkation.

ASSAULT LANDINGS

13. The plan of the assault landing was given in Commander Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR Attack Landing Order No. 18-44. The landing was a simple one consisting of two

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

battalions landing abreast from Divisions SIX and TWENTY-FOUR, respectively, in boat waves consisting of 6 LCVP's with each wave to land at 5-minute intervals. Red Beach was divided in half and the northern half was assigned to Transport Division SIX, the southern half to Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR. Transports anchored in the outer transport area approximately abreast their beach, distant 7 miles. In order to carry out the time schedule it was necessary that the boats of the first four waves be loaded promptly. No difficulty was experienced in loading and forming the boat waves within the allowed time and all waves were despatched on time from the transports. Although no satisfactory photographs of the beach had been received prior to the landing it was found that the condition of the beach was such that the LCVP's could go directly to the beach and land troops. There was practically no surf and the beach was sandy and very satisfactory for this type of operation. The Line of Departure was established 5,000 yards from the beach and it was marked by PC 1129 and PC 623 on the north and in the center respectively, the Control Officer being stationed in PC 623 and the Division Beachmaster of Transport Division SIX in PC 1129. The Division Beachmaster embarked promptly after arrival in transport area in PC 1129 and that vessel proceeded immediately to its station on the Line of Departure. Upon arrival of the boat waves at the Line of Departure they were despatched in the usual manner by two-blocking and executing the appropriate numeral flags by the Control Officer in PC 623. The first wave was despatched on schedule at 0943 and landed exactly at H-Hour. Succeeding waves up to and including the twelfth were despatched from the Line of Departure exactly on time and the first five waves landed on the beach at the scheduled time, with no wave up the twelfth, landing more than a few minutes behind schedule. The thirteenth wave was despatched 9 minutes late to allow the LST's to proceed closer to the beach and the succeeding waves, fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth, were despatched late, the sixteenth being approximately 21 minutes late. The Control Officer apparently desired to leave ample time intervals between LCM and LST waves. The landing schedule and the actual time of landing are shown in enclosure (C).

14. Sporadic mortar fire was received in the vicinity of the beach from approximately H - 10 to H + 120 minutes and a few shells, apparently from mountain guns, landed in the vicinity of the Line of Departure. No boats of Transport Division SIX were hit or damaged by enemy action .

15. A steady flow of valuable reports was received from the FAYETTE Boat Group Commander who led the first wave in, and commencing at H + 35 minutes reports were received from the FAYETTE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

beachmaster, who had by that time set up his command post and his communication system on the beach. The off-shore conditions were such that only 3 LST's of those scheduled to beach could reach the beach, these LST's landing on Beach Red Dog. No LST's could beach on the beach assigned Transport Division SIX. LSM's, however, had no difficulty in beaching and unloading vehicles on Beach Red Easy Two and Red Fox.

16. There were no obstructions encountered by boats in the assault and apparently there were no mines along the beach. It was noted, however, that some type of enemy marker which appeared to be a belly tank with a mirror or other reflecting device located on the shoreward side had been planted in the approach area; It was observed that three successive LST's, upon passing this marker, were hit by three successive shots from artillery. It is believed that the enemy artillery had been previously registered on this marker and as the LST's passed it close aboard they were taken under fire. This possibility had been considered prior to the landing and all boat coxswains had been instructed to carefully avoid all obstructions or other objects which might be found in the boat lanes.

17. The assault landing was highly successful and precise. It was well conceived and well executed.

UNLOADING

18. With the small combat loads carried by the APA's no difficulty was anticipated in unloading and no serious difficulties were encountered. In addition to the boats carried by the ships of this division thirteen additional LCM's and two LSM's were allocated to this division which provided ample boat facilities for a rapid unloading. Since all vehicles embarked were loaded with cargo, including ammunition, water and rations, first priority was given throughout the division to the unloading of vehicles. Beach conditions were such that the vehicles could be driven directly from the boats and all boats carrying vehicles were unloaded promptly and expeditiously at the beach. Since the transports had moved to the inner transport area, thus reducing the length of the boat trips, there was little delay caused by not having boats available for loading at the ships. LCM's were used initially to unload only vehicles which could not have been unloaded in LCVP's. Bulk cargo was unloaded only on the last trip required from any LCM. Some difficulty was experienced on the beach in unloading bulk cargo due to the lack of sufficient bull-dozer and other prime movers which had been loaded in the

12 03075

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

LST's which could not beach; Much of the bulk cargo landed from LCVP's had to be man-handled. Furthermore, some of the shore party personnel which were assigned for unloading were embarked in the LST's and were not available on the beach. Naval personnel of the beach party and boat crews assisted throughout the operation in handling cargo and unloading boats on the beach. The necessity for such assistance had been foreseen and instructions had been previously issued that naval personnel would assist as far as possible in unloading cargo from boats. No attempt was made to transport cargo to inland dumps but it was taken fully above the high water line and placed in proper piles. The unloading operation was a simple one. There was little or no interference by the enemy and the unloading was considered to be highly satisfactory.

BEACH PARTY, SHORE PARTY AND SALVAGE GROUPS

19. In this operation a sector of the beach was assigned to each ship for unloading in order from left to right, ORMSBY, HERCULES, FAYETTE, TITANIA, LEEDSTOWN. The ORMSBY beachmaster controlled one-third of the beach on the left flank and the FAYETTE beachmaster two-thirds of the beach on the right flank, the LEEDSTOWN beach party being held in reserve. The Boat Group Commanders from the ships were stationed off their respective beaches and controlled the traffic from those points. The assignments of definite sectors for unloading prevented confusion and congestion and the operation of each sector was satisfactory. The beachmasters set up their command posts in close proximity of the Shore Party Commanders and these officers worked together in complete cooperation.

20. Four salvage boats operated off the beach but because of the excellent beach conditions and lack of damage caused by the enemy no serious salvage problems arose. The salvage LCM's provided by the 532nd Engineer Beach and Shore Regiment, which were equipped with pumps of capacity of 500 gallons per minute, in addition to other equipment, were extremely valuable in pumping out stranded boats. Stranding in most cases was caused by overloading LCVP's.

MEDICAL PLAN

21. Enclosure (D), a copy of the report of the Beach Party Medical Officer is concurred in. It is believed that the medical facilities of the transports should be used and even though LST's can beach and operate as contemplated in the Medical

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

Plan, the beach party medical section should be landed with all equipment, organized to render medical treatment and to evacuate casualties to the transports if required. In previous operations the operation of Beach Party Medical Sections were highly efficient and satisfactory.

COMMUNICATIONS

22. The communication plan was adequate and communications were satisfactory. The TBS was overloaded and circuit discipline on this circuit was poor, stations frequently breaking in on important tactical transmissions.

23. In the ship-to-shore communications, certain difficulties were encountered.

(a) The communications of the Transport Division Beachmaster aboard the PC 1129 were hindered by an insufficient power supply. Only four 6-volt batteries, two of which were constantly on charge, were on board to serve two 6Ø8's, one 5Ø8, one 61Ø, one TCS, and one TCE. The situation can be permanently solved by having at least four extra 6-volt batteries as standard equipment on a PC type control vessel, or by installing a motor generator to answer extra power demands. The situation was temporarily solved by furnishing the PC additional batteries upon arrival in the transport area.

(b) Though this command was required to man two SCR 3ØØ nets, these nets were paralleled by two 61Ø nets, and therefore were not used. The SCR 3ØØ has the disadvantage of feeding excessively into other nets, and if used as a primary net may interrupt important communications aboard ship. Whenever possible in the communication plan, it ought to be recognized that the SCR 3ØØ is secondary and to be used only when no other means of communications will work.

Very good.
24. As for the general communication plan it is believed that an overall Pacific Communication Plan applicable to the THIRD, FIFTH, and SEVENTH Fleets is necessary. Units are constantly shifted from one fleet to another and communications would be more efficient and more easily carried out if CentComTwo and CANF communication plans were combined into perhaps a "PacComOne".

25. With regard to the LEYTE operation in particular, the following comments are submitted.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

(a) Reception on the Task Force Common could perhaps be improved by the continuation of the 12000 kcs. frequency during hours of darkness when the force is located at some distance from the base ship. For several hours after midnight, the 4000 and 8000 kcs. frequencies faded out completely, and despite reruns, there were several missing numbers on the schedule. Also the time for change from one frequency to another ought to be indicated by appropriate "Q" signal or by prearranged time schedule.

(b) The plan required that all ships guard 2016 kcs., and 3115 or 3000 kcs. as warning circuits under way or in the assault area. By last minute arrangement with the Task Force Commander, ships of the transport unit were allowed to secure 2016 kcs., thereby making available to each ship a badly needed medium-high frequency receiver. In future operations, it is recommended that the same arrangement be made.

(c) Confusion in voice calls was due to the fact that both CentComTwo and CANF calls were used. A general Pacific Communication Plan would eliminate much of this voice call confusion.

CASUALTIES

26. During the assault and unloading phase this division suffered only one man wounded. No damage was done to any vessel by enemy action nor was any damage inflicted on the enemy by this division. No boats were damaged beyond capacity of ships force to repair.

ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT

27. No guns were fired by any ship of this division.

BATTLE DAMAGE

28. No battle damage was sustained by any vessel of this division.

COMMENT AND CONCLUSIONS

29. The basic ship-to-shore plan was sound and was executed as planned.

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
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

30. The use of additional LCM(6)s provided by the Army aided greatly in the unloading. This type of boat is of greater value than any other type carried by the transports.

31. The vessels of the Amphibious Force are experienced in ship-to-shore combat operations and have worked out in detail the various phases of such an operation. On each operation the shore party, which is furnished by the Landing Force, is usually inexperienced, in many cases it is their first combat landing. As a result, the transports can be considered to be more proficient in the ship-to-shore movement than any Landing Force it is likely to encounter. It is believed that the ship-to-shore movement will not reach its maximum efficiency until the shore parties reach the state of training comparable to that attained by the transports. This efficiency can be attained only by a "professional" shore party which should operate with a transport group on successive operations.

32. The ships were well handled and the ship-to-shore movements were well executed by their commanding officers, the boat groups were efficiently handled, the boat crews were well trained and proficient. The performance of duty of all officers and men of this division was of the highest and deserving of recognition and commendation.


H. D. BAKER.

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SUMMARY OF CARGO LOADED IN DIVISION

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TONNAGE TABLE, TRANSPORT DIVISION SIX

	VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND GUNS	AMMUNITION	FUEL	RATIONS	OTHER GENERAL CARGO	TOTAL SHORT TONS
FAYETTE (APA-43)	223	53	0	39	35	350
ORMSBY (APA-49)	171	89	0	48	17	325
LEEDSTOWN (APA-56)	220	50	0	33	23	326
TITANIA (AKA-13)	499	323	200	0	12	1034
HERCULES (AK-41)	581	214	780	2	200	1777

VEHICLE TABLE, TRANSPORT DIVISION SIX

FAYETTE (APA-43)	ORMSBY (APA-49)	LEEDSTOWN (APA-56)
3 - SPM-M8's (75mm)	1 - D6 Tractor	3 - SPM-M8's (75mm)
8 - 2½ Ton Trucks	2 - TD9 Tractors	7 - 2½ Ton Trucks
11 - 3/4 Ton Trucks	7 - 2½ Ton Trucks	1 - 1½ Ton Truck
6 - 37mm Guns	2 - 1½ Ton Trucks	1 - 1 Ton Ambulance
35 - 1/4 Ton Trucks	10 - 3/4 Ton Trucks	6 - 3/4 Ton Trucks
18 - 1/4 Ton Trailers	1 - 3/4 Ton Trucks	6 - 37mm Guns
4 - 3/4 Ton Ambulances	3 - 37mm Guns	31 - 1/4 Ton Trucks
1 - 1½ Ton Truck	26 - 1/4 Ton Trucks	18 - 1/4 Ton Trailers
3 - Water Trailers	14 - 1/4 Ton Trailers	2 - Water Trailers
1 - Disinfectant Trailer	3 - 1 Ton Trailers	1 - Pole Trailer
90 - TOTAL VEHICLES	2 - Water Trailers	1 - 1 Ton Trailer
	71 - TOTAL VEHICLES	77 - TOTAL VEHICLES

TITANIA (AKA-13)	HERCULES (AK-41)
30 - 2½ Ton Trucks	38 - 2½ Ton Trucks
5 - 2½ Ton Amphibs	1 - LVT
5 - TD9 Tractors	1 - HD8 Tractor
10 - 3/4 Ton Trucks	11 - 1½ Ton Trucks
10 - LVT's	10 - 3/4 Ton Trucks
4 - 105mm Howitzers	3 - 37mm Guns
5 - 1 Ton Limbers	8 - 40mm Guns
1 - 4 Ton Wrecker	30 - 1/4 Ton Trucks
1 - 1½ Ton Truck	5 - .50 Cal. MG's
8 - 1/4 Ton Trucks	2 - 1/4 Ton Trailers
1 - 1/4 Ton Trailer	17 - 1 Ton Trailers
14 - 1 Ton Trailers	6 - Water Trailers
1 - Water Trailer	1 - 4 Ton Wrecker
95 - TOTAL VEHICLES	133 - TOTAL VEHICLES

ENCLOSURE (A)

12 03075

14

12

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (B)

SUMMARY OF UNITS EMBARKED IN DIVISION

U.S.S. FAYETTE

LT.COL. POSTLETHWAIT (34th Inf)

*3rd Bn 34th Inf W/Bn Med Sec (-3rd Bn AT Plt)	820
*2d Plt Can Co 34th Inf (3-MS in LCM)	30
*1st & 2d Plts & Mine Plt AT Co 34th Inf	98
*Det Serv Co 34th Inf	19
*Det Hq & Hq Co 34th Inf	84
* $\frac{1}{2}$ Regtl Med Sec 34th Inf	12
*"C" Btry 63rd FA Bn	7
*Det Hq & Serv Btrys 63rd FA Bn	35
*F O Party, B Btry 63rd FA Bn	7
*3rd Plt Co C 3rd Engr & Hq Co 3rd Engr	
*2d Plt Co C 24th Med Bn	32
*3rd Plt Co D 85th Cml Bn	37
*1st Plt 603rd M Tk Co	
Det 532nd Engr B&S Regt & NB Party	92
1/3 609th Port Co	72
Det 36th Evac Hosp (-Dets)	45
407th Med Coll Co (-Dets)	36
Det Hq & Hq Co 24th Div	16
Det 24th Sig Co	3
Photo Unit A	6
TOTAL	1451

Note: *Indicates units attached to or in direct support of CT-34.

U.S.S. ORMSBY

LT COL. PEARSALL, 34th INF.

*2d Bn 34th Inf W/Bn Med Sed	850
*Det Serv Co 34th Inf	12
*Det Hq & Hq Co 34th Inf	30
* $\frac{1}{2}$ Regtl Med Sec 34th Inf	13
*B Btry 63rd FA Bn	7
*Det Hq & Serv Btrys 63rd FA Bn	45
2d Plt Co C 3rd Engr	12
*1st Plt Co C 24th Med Bn	32
*2d Plt Co D 85th Cml Bn	47
*Det 24th QM Co	22
Det 532nd Engr B & S Regt	17
1/3 609th Port Co	71
Det 339th Engr Con Bn	80
Air In Party	6
605th Med Clr Co	105
Photo Unit A	1
TOTAL	1350

Note: * Indicates units attached to or in direct support of CT-34

(15)

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE (B)

SUMMARY OF UNITS EMBARKED IN DIVISION

U.S.S. LEEDSTOWN

MAJOR EDRIS, 34TH INF

*1st Bn 34th Inf W/Bn Med Sec	850
*1st Plt & Co Hq Can Co 34th Inf	39
*3rd Plt & Co Hq AT Co 34th Inf	40
*Det Serv Co 34th Inf	27
*Det Hq & Hq Co 34th Inf	36
*A Btry FA Bn	7
*Det Hq & Serv Batry 63rd FA BN	76
1st Plt Co C 3rd Engr	42
*Station Pltr Co C 24th Med Bn	32
*1st Plt Co D 85th Cml Bn	56
*Co D 24th Med Bn (-1 Plt)	60
Det 532d Engr B&S Regt	14
1/3 609th Port Co	71
*Det 101st QM GR Reg Plt	6
	<hr/>
TOTAL	1356

Note: *Indicates units attached to or in direct support of CT-34.

U.S.S. TITANIA

CAPT. ISAAK, 34TH INF

*Det Serv Co 34th Inf	24
*Det Hq & Hq Co 34th Inf	2
*A Batry FA Bn	77
*Det Hq & Serv Btry 63rd FA Bn	39
*Co D 24th Med Bn (-1 Plt)	15
*Det 724th Ord Co	10
Det 532d Engr B&S Regt	37
Det 3rd Plat Co A 727th Amph Trac Bn	33
1/3 609th Port Co	2
171st Bomb Disposal Squad	7
Air Ln Party	3
Det 36th Evac Hosp (-Dets)	25
	<hr/>
TOTAL	274

Note: *Indicates units attached to or in direct support of CT-34.

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ENCLOSURE (B)

SUMMARY OF UNITS EMBARKED IN DIVISION

U.S.S. HERCULES

11th FA Bn	2
3rd ENGR Bn	23
24th SIGN. CO.	7
Hq & Hq Co.	21
Det 24th QM	5
24th Div. BAND	36
24th MED Bn	17
469th AAA Bn	51
Co C 583rd Sig Bn	38
Co A 262 MED Bn	24
Det 532 EB & S	1
Det 339 ENGR	51
636th ORD AMM	11
727th AMPH TRAC	3
TOTAL	<u>290</u>

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ENCLOSURE (C)

TIME OF DEPARTURE AND LANDING OF BOAT WAVES

RED BEACH TWO

<u>WAVE</u>	<u>LEFT R.D.V.</u>	<u>SCHEDULED TO LEAVE LOD</u>	<u>LEFT LOD</u>	<u>LANDED</u>
1	0855	0943	0943	1000
2	0900	0945	0948	1005
3	0903	0953	0953	1010
4	0910	0958	0958	1015
5	0915	1003	1003	1020
6	0920	1008	1008	1026
7	0925	1018	1018	1037
8	0930	1023	1023	1040
9	0935	1028	1028	1047
10	0940	1033	1033	1051
11	0945	1038	1038	1055
15	1000	1108	1122	1139
16	1017	1118	1139	1156

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ENCLOSURE (D)

REPORT OF BEACH PARTY MEDICAL SECTION

1. The Medical Section of the FAYETTE Beach Party embarked for the beach at approximately 0800 20 October 1944. Four (4) hospital corpsmen, a radioman, a signalman, and the Medical Officer were boated in an LCVP flying the "mike" flag and designated as the "Medical Boat". This boat had been preloaded with twenty (20) stretchers and such medical gear as was deemed necessary for handling initial casualties. The Medical Boat followed the first wave into the line of departure where it stood by the PC-1129 awaiting further orders from Lieut. Comdr. BAGGS, Beachmaster, Transport Division SIX. One (1) hospital corpsman was boated in the fifth (5) wave with Lieutenant J.W. SMITH, FAYETTE Beachmaster in order to care for any initial casualties in this group. The Medical Section of the FAYETTE Beach Party was called into the beach by the FAYETTE Beachmaster at approximately 1025 and landed at 1035. The beach was under sniper and machine gun fire at the time of landing, hence the medical section was able to land only what could be easily and quickly carried; this consisted of corps pouches, beach bags (2), six (6) litters and a 610 radio; the remainder was left in the boat to be called in later.

2. Casualty density was light on RED Beach "FOX" on A-Day. In all, 24 casualties were evacuated to LST's; seventeen (17) were evacuated to LST 456; four (4) were evacuated to LST 181; and three (3) were evacuated to LST 459. It may seem on first glance that LST 456 was over loaded; however, this was done in following out the Operation Order. LST 456 had aboard (in conjunction to a surgical team) the Orthopedic Specialist; therefore, to this ship were sent the orthopedic cases or those which on original impression were considered to be of an orthopedic nature. As a high percentage of the casualties were of an orthopedic nature, no other course could be followed.

3. Evacuation of casualties presented a difficult and disconcerting problem. The plan as originally conceived was to evacuate all A-Day casualties to LST's, four (4) of which were to have Surgical teams and Specialists aboard. This plan as it was intended to work would have given care of the most excellent type in the shortest possible time; however, several vital factors were not considered or were deemed not to be present, and it is to these factors that the difficulties of evacuation were attributed. Firstly, in order for this plan to work smoothly and effeciently, the LST's had to beach; this was found to be impossible. The LST 459 tried to beach on RED Beach FOX at approximately 1050 but was unable to get closer to the beach than 150 yards. This left the ramp in approximately 6 feet of water which prevented bringing casualties aboard other than by small

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ENCLOSURE (D) Contd.

boats. The LST 459 retracted some 15 minutes later and stood by off shore. Secondly, the majority of surgical care was embarked in four (4) LST's which were supposed to beach at an early hour, discharge their cargo and personnel, and receive casualties almost immediately. Unfortunately LST 171 was hit by enemy fire as she approached the beach, rendering her useless as casualty LST; this decreased our surgical teams and specialists by $\frac{1}{4}$, which was a serious loss. Due to the fact that the LST's could not beach, they could not discharge their cargo and troops and hence were slow in setting up their medical facilities. Thirdly, since all casualties had to be evacuated to LST's by LCVP's a serious difficulty in the plan was discovered. The plan called for sending certain types of casualties to certain LST's; this was next to impossible, practically speaking. If 4 casualties, one orthopedic, one thoracic, one eye, and one urological were present at any one time; it would necessitate four (4) LCVP's to carry these casualties to the correct LST; or it would require one LCVP to make four stops thereby consuming time and adding to the casualties discomfort. While it is recognized that this is somewhat of an exaggeration, nevertheless; it is believed that the point can be clearly seen; namely, that the plan necessitated too many LCVP's or too much time was consumed in handling the casualties. It also consumes the time and effort of one or more Medical Officers in doing nothing but allocating casualties when their energy and skill could be utilized in caring for the wounded. Fourthly, a great deal of time was consumed in locating the Shore Party Medical Section since the Beach Party Medical Officer concerned was unknown to the Army Medical Officer concerned. Such Officers with their sections should be aboard the same transport.

4. It is the opinion of the Medical Officer that casualty evacuation could have been handled more efficiently if casualties had been sent directly to the transports. The transports were available, were set up, and had efficient proven medical staffs aboard. If specialization is desired, these specialists should be placed aboard one transport so designated (APH) and all specialized casualties sent to that ship. If LST's are to be used, they should be empty or very lightly loaded and should carry pontoon causways which could be utilized when the LST could not beach. Moreover if casualty density is great more LST's will have to be available in order to handle the number of patients which they would receive. Supplies were quite well handled. 50 litters were passed on to the collecting company through the Fayette Medical Section in addition to 20 litters which were boated originally.

E.W. CLAWATER, Jr.
Lieut. MC-V(G), USNR.
Beach Party Medical Officer.

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A16-3
Serial 0207

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
COMMANDER TRANSPORT DIVISION TWENTY-FOUR
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

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
First Endorsement on
CTD-6 conf. ltr. A16-3/
A9-8, serial 0122 of
25 October 1944.

25 October 1944.

From: The Commander Transport Division TWENTY-FOUR.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via: (1) Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force.
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the opinions expressed
and in the recommendation for the promulgation of an overall
Pacific communication plan.


T. B. BRITTAIN.

Copy to:
CTD SIX.

SECOND ENDORSEMENT
FE25/A16-3
Serial: 01689


SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

6 DEC 1944

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From: Commander Task Force 78.
(Commander SEVENTH Amphibious Force).
To : Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via : Commander Task Force 77.
(Commander SEVENTH Fleet).

1. Forwarded.


G. D. MORRISON,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Operations.

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UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3(F-3-4/whr)

Serial 03305

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12 DEC 1944


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THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CTD-6 conf. ltr. A16-3/
A9-8, serial 0122 of
25 October 1944.

12 03075

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander In Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Operation Report of Assault of LEYTE Island,
20 October 1944.

1. Forwarded.


J. H. LONG
By direction.